Nu Holdings Ltd (NYSE: NU)
🏦

Nu Holdings Ltd (NYSE: NU)

Tags
2026
NYSE
LatAm
Initiation Report
Finance
Published
April 20, 2026
Author
Christopher Hwang
Data primarily sourced from Nu Holdings FY2025 earnings release (February 2026) and publicly available analyst coverage. FX-neutral figures used where stated. All views are for educational purposes.
PDF version available:
 
Recommendation
Entry Price
Target Price
Upside
Market Cap
Date
BUY
$14.51
$18.52
19% ▲
$70.5B
12 April 2026
Disclaimer This report has been prepared solely for academic and educational purposes. It does not constitute investment advice, financial advice, or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. The analysis is based on publicly available information believed to be reliable, but no representation is made as to its accuracy or completeness. Any opinions, forecasts, or valuation estimates are those of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. The author does not hold any position in the securities discussed. This report is prepared in a personal academic capacity and is not associated with, endorsed by, or representative of any investment adviser, financial institution, current employer, or other organisation. Readers should conduct their own independent research and seek professional advice before making any investment decision.

Executive Summary

INVESTMENT VIEW ** Initial pitch completed in Mid-April, with the earnings released in 14 May 2026. Financial model has not been updated yet.
We initiate coverage of Nu Holdings Ltd. (NU.NYSE) with a BUY rating and a target price of US$18.52, implying +27.6% upside from the entry price of US$14.51. Our thesis rests on three independent legs: growth duration in Mexico and Colombia, structural cost advantage across the banking stack, and ARPAC expansion from existing customers.
Nu is no longer a simple Brazil neobank story. Brazil has already validated the model: by FY2025, Nu reached 131m customers globally, including 113m customers in Brazil, with Brazil representing 62% adult penetration. The company also generated US$16.3bn revenue, US$2.9bn net income, and 33% ROE, showing that the platform has already crossed from customer-acquisition fintech into profitable digital banking at scale. The market still appears to underwrite Nu as a mature Brazil-led digital bank. We disagree. Brazil is now the proof market, but the investment case is increasingly about whether the Brazil monetisation curve can travel into Mexico and Colombia. Mexico is the key swing factor: Nu has already reached around 15% adult penetration and became the leading issuer of new credit cards, but remains structurally earlier than Brazil in lending penetration, deposit depth and ARPAC maturity.
Nu’s model is not simply “cheap banking”. It is a low-friction acquisition funnel, followed by risk-priced monetisation. The company enters with no-fee cards, digital accounts and attractive deposits, then monetises through credit card interest, personal loans, interchange, late fees, deposits and balance-sheet spread. This matters because the visible customer offer can look cheap, while the portfolio economics remain attractive if underwriting and funding discipline hold.
Our base valuation is anchored on a Residual Income Model, not a conventional DCF. For a bank-like fintech, equity capital, provisions, ROE and excess return are more important than EBITDA or free cash flow. The model produces a base RIM value of US$18.46, with a weighted target price of US$18.52 after relative valuation cross-checks.
  • Growth Duration is Underestimated. Brazil has proven the model, but Mexico is earlier in the same curve. The market is underpricing the duration of high-ROE growth if Mexico follows even part of Brazil’s path from card-led acquisition into deposits, lending and primary banking. Colombia is not yet central to earnings, but adds long-duration optionality.
  • Four Costs Moat. Nu’s advantage compounds across customer acquisition, servicing, funding and risk. Cost to serve remained around US$0.8 per active customer per month, while deposits reached US$41.9bn in FY2025, funding a US$32.7bn credit portfolio. This creates a deposit-funded lending flywheel that incumbents cannot easily replicate without dismantling branch-led cost structures.
  • ARPAC Runway. Nu does not need another customer boom to compound earnings. The next leg is getting existing users to behave more like mature Brazil cohorts: account, card, deposits, personal loan, investments, insurance and SME products. Q4’25 ARPAC reached US$15, while the model assumes a pathway towards higher mature-cohort monetisation over time.
The main risks are not cosmetic. Nu is still a consumer-credit business, and its earnings are exposed to NPLs, provisions, funding cost, deposit-rate competition and regulatory cost creep. Q4’25 15-90 day NPL was 4.1% and 90+ NPL was 6.6%, so the bull case depends on credit growth remaining risk-adjusted, not simply fast. Several catalysts require Nu to prove, not reinvent, the model. Quarterly earnings, Mexico lending penetration, ARPAC step-up, loan-to-deposit deployment and credit quality resilience are the key re-rating triggers. The thesis does not require the US bank launch, Colombia acceleration or capital return to work immediately; those are upside optionality rather than base-case drivers.
Investment conclusion: Nu is a high-ROE digital banking platform where Brazil validates the economics, Mexico drives the next growth-duration debate, and ARPAC expansion converts existing scale into earnings. At the current entry price, the market is not fully pricing the durability of Nu’s excess returns.

Industry Analysis

Industry Overview

Digital banking – neobank, challenger bank, digital bank, mobile bank – sits between traditional deposit-taking banking and technology-enabled financial services. The key distinction is not merely channel mix; but the core operating model. Incumbent banks digitise their existing branch-led franchises; neobanks are usually cloud-native, mobile-first institutions build around lower customer acquisition cost, lower cost-to-serve, faster product iteration and data-led underwriting. In practice, the category includes different categories of financial institutions:
Category
Typical balance-sheet model
Revenue model
Examples
Licensed digital banks / neobanks
Own banking licence; deposit-funded lending
Net interest income, interchange, fees, lending spreads
Nubank, Monzo, Starling, Revolut(where licensed)
Bank-partner neobanks
Programme manager or technology layer over partner bank
Interchange, subscription fees, partner economics
Chime, Varo(historically), some US challengers
Wallets / payment ecosystems
Stored value, merchant acquiring, wallet balances; lending may follow
Merchant discount rate, payment fees, float, credit
Mercado Pago, PicPay, Paytm
Super-app / commerce-led finance
Financial services attached to commerce or mobility
Payments, credit, advertising, merchant services
MercadoLibre/Mercado Pago, Grab, SeaMoney
Specialist digital lenders
Often wholesale funded or securitised
Interest income, origination fees, servicing
Klarna, Affirm, Upstart
Neobanks, therefore, compete in two different profit pools. The first is consumer banking: deposits, cards, personal loans, overdrafts and investment products. The second is payments and commerce: acquiring, wallets, instant payments, merchant tools and working-capital credit.
LATAM is structurally attractive: first profit pool (consumer banking) is highly concentrated among incumbents, while the second is still being reshaped by instant payment rails and mobile penetration. Brazil is the most advanced market: Pix has become the leading payment method since its 2020 launch and processed more than R$26tr in 2024; with Pix Automatico adding recurring-payment functionality in 20251. Mexico and Colombia are quite earlier stage in the curve; with cash still materially more important. An OECD/Cofece note states that in Mexico, roughly half of adults lacked a bank account; nine out of ten lacked a credit card and only one-third had paid digitally, illustrating the remaining inclusion runway2.
This structurally creates a different industry landscape from the developed markets in the US and Europe. In DM, neobanks often win on experience, transparency and niche community positioning; however, they face saturated account ownership and lower card-credit spreads (given the interest rate environment as well). In LATAM, digital banks has a lot of potential to expand the market itself: first account, first card, first formal savings product and first formal credit line. Nubank’s Brazil trajectory shows the archetype: acquire at low cost with a simple no-fee card and digital account; afterwards, then cross-sell credit, savings, investments, insurance and SME products as engagement and data history increase.

Competitive Landscape

The global landscape is bifurcated between public fintech platforms, private neobanks and incumbent banks with large digital franchises. Market capitalisation is not a pure measure of neobank scale because some groups; notably MercadoLibre, combine commerce, payments, credit and advertising.
Player
Region / core market
Model
Customers / scale marker
Market cap
Mercado Libre Mercado Pago
LATAM
Commerce-led fintech ecosystem
Large commerce + wallet/acquiring platform
c.$78.4bn
Itau Unibanco
Brazil
Incumbent universal bank
Largest private bank in Brazil by assets/profits
c.$76.8bn
Banco Santander Brasil
Brazil
Incumbent universal bank
Large retail and SME franchise
c.$39.8bn
Banco Bradesco
Brazil
Incumbent universal bank
Large retail and insurance bank
c.$37.0b
Revolut
UK / global
Multi-product neobank
>65m retail customers in 2025
$75bn*
SoFi
US
Digital financial platform
Lending-led, bank charter
c.$21.5bn
Chime
US
Bank-partner neobank
US mass-market primary-account challenger
c.$11.6bn**
Monzo
UK
Licensed neobank
UK primary-account challenger
Private
Nubank / Nu Holdings
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia
Digital bank / platform
131m customers at FY25; c.135m by Q1 2026
c.$70.5bn
  • Private valuation ** IPO valuation
Within LATAM region, there are three layers across the competitive landscape.
First comes the incumbent traditional banks, retaining deposit scale, payroll relationships, branch networks, business banking relationships and regulatory familiarity. Itau, Bradesco, Santander Brasil, Banco do Brasil and Banorte remain formidable. Their weakness is not capital; rather, it is the legacy cost base to acquire new clients, product complexity and high fees due to historical legacy. Second are the regional digital platform: Nubank, Mercardo Pago, PicPay, Uala and Banco Inter attack different entry points: consumer credit, wallet, merchant acquiring, investments or SME banking. However the aim is similar; once entered, cross-selling and expanding to the client is the penetration they are actually trying to achieve. Third, global challengers, such as Revolut, are entering selectively; but local regulation, credit data, cash network and trust creates barriers to simply replicate cross-border.
LATAM as a region is not a single market. Brazil is the neobank market with deepest penetration, with Pix (open finance platform) and high banking spreads create both infrastructure and margin opportunity. Mexico is more cash-heavy and underbanked; success requires hybrid distribution such as cash-in/cash-out parternships, which explains Nubank’s Oxxo partnership to reach more than 30,000 locations.3 Colombia is smaller, but attractive – because formal credit penetration is lower, and the regulator is fintech-friendly. The strategic implication for Nu: Brazil is now a monetisation and operating leverage story; Mexico and Colombia remain land-grab and credit-model localisation storeis.

Brazilian banking landscape: Unique, concentrated, profitable, but structurally disrupted

Brazil historically had one of the most concentrated and profitable banking systems in EM. The core private incumbents are Itaú Unibanco, Bradesco, Santander Brasil and BTG Pactual, while Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal remain major state-linked institutions. The traditional model was built around branch networks, payroll accounts, credit cards, overdrafts, insurance, asset management and SME/corporate banking. High interest rates, sticky deposits, fee income and cross-sell historically supported strong ROEs.
The key point for NU is that Brazil was overbanked at the institutional level but under-served at the consumer level. Large banks existed, but many consumers faced expensive products, weak service, limited transparency and uneven access to unsecured credit. That created the opening for digital attackers.
Brazil’s top-five bank concentration remains high by global standards: World Bank-based data show the top five banks held around 70% of commercial banking assets in 20214, although competition has been rising at the margin as fintechs scale.
The competitive structure now looks like this:
Segment
Main Players
Strategic Position
Universal incumbents
Itaú, Bradesco, Banco do Brasil, Caixa, Santander Brasil
Balance sheet, credit underwriting, corporate/SME banking, payroll, wealth, insurance
Investment/wealth-led banks
BTG Pactual, XP ecosystem
Affluent customers, investments, advisory, SME/corporate expansion
Digital banks / neobanks
Nubank, Inter, C6, PicPay
Low-cost acquisition, app-first banking, unsecured credit, marketplace and ecosystem cross-sell
Payments/commerce platforms
Mercado Pago, PagBank, Stone, Cielo, Rede, Getnet
Merchant acquiring, wallet, credit, working capital, marketplace-driven financial services
BigTech / telco-adjacent
WhatsApp Pay, Apple Pay, Google Pay, NuCel-type adjacencies
Payments interface, distribution, data, engagement
The important nuance: Nubank is not simply taking deposits from banks. It is trying to become the primary consumer financial interface. Mercado Pago is doing something slightly different: it is extending from commerce and merchant payments into broader financial services.
The Brazilian Central Bank has been a major driver of disruption. Pix, launched as an open instant-payment scheme, reduced dependence on branches, cash and card rails, while increasing daily engagement with digital accounts. Brazil’s Pix system has become dominant, with Reuters reporting that it processed more than BRL 26tn in transactions in the prior year and has overtaken cash, debit and credit cards in usage. The launch of Pix Automático for recurring payments further expands digital financial inclusion, especially for consumers without credit cards.
Open Finance is the second regulatory pillar. The Central Bank states that Open Finance is designed to improve efficiency in credit and payment markets by making the system more inclusive and competitive. For fintechs, this weakens incumbents’ data advantage and enables better underwriting, but it also means data portability can eventually work against scaled challengers too. Prudential regulation is also becoming more important: Brazil applies proportional regulatory requirements across financial institutions, and as fintechs become larger, compliance, capital and risk-management standards become a bigger barrier to entry.
Global banks have generally struggled to attack Brazilian mass-market retail directly. The successful foreign-bank model is Santander Brasil, which operates as a deeply local universal bank rather than a light-touch foreign entrant. Other global banks are more likely to penetrate through corporate banking, capital markets, FX, custody, wealth management, partnerships, minority investments or acquisition of local platforms. C6 Bank, backed by JPMorgan, is a useful example of this route: global banks can buy into local digital distribution rather than build a Nubank-like platform from scratch.
For regional digital platforms, the key strategic pattern is entry-point expansion. Nubank began with a no-fee, app-first credit card and expanded into digital accounts, Pix, deposits, personal loans, investments, insurance, SME products and marketplace features. By Q1 2026, Nu reported over 135m customers globally, including more than 115m in Brazil, making it the largest private financial institution in Brazil by customer count. The investment question is therefore not whether Nubank can acquire users; it is whether it can convert those users into primary, multi-product, risk-adjusted profitable banking relationships.
Mercado Pago follows a different path. Its wedge is commerce: marketplace payments, merchant acquiring, wallet usage and merchant credit. This gives it transaction data from both consumers and SMEs, making it a strong competitor in payments, working-capital finance and embedded financial services. The distinction is important: Nubank is consumer-banking-first, while Mercado Pago is commerce-and-payments-first. Both are trying to become the daily financial interface, but they start from different behavioural data sets and customer relationships.
Mexico and Colombia represent the next test of whether Nubank’s Brazil playbook is exportable. Mexico is attractive because banking penetration is lower and cash usage remains high, but it lacks Brazil’s Pix-like adoption curve. Nubank’s Oxxo partnership in Mexico, giving access to around 22,000 stores for cash withdrawals and deposits, shows that regional expansion requires local infrastructure adaptation, not pure app-only replication.
Investment takeaway: Brazil has moved from branch-led banking concentration to platform-led financial competition. Pix and Open Finance enabled challengers to scale, but also commoditised parts of payments and lowered switching costs. Nubank’s advantage is now less about being a neobank and more about scale, funding, underwriting data, cost efficiency and cross-sell. The next phase of the thesis is therefore platform banking: can Nubank deepen monetisation faster than Mercado Pago, incumbents and other digital challengers can replicate its customer relationship?

Industry specifics and brand positioning

Digital banking brands are less homogeneous than the word “neobank” implies. Their positioning normally reflects the wedge product:
Positioning
Customer promise
Economics
Representative players
Anti-fee / simplicity
Fair, transparent, no bureaucracy
Low-cost acquisition; cross-sell later
Nubank, Monzo
Global money app
FX, travel, multi-currency, premium subscriptions
Subscriptions, FX/spread, wealth, business
Revolut, Wise
Early-pay / everyday cash-flow
Salary access, overdraft alternatives, debit usage
Interchange and subscription-lite economics
Chime
Commerce wallet
Pay, receive, sell, borrow inside marketplace
Acquiring, wallet float, merchant credit
Mercado Pago
High-yield savings / digital deposit
Better rates, digital onboarding
Deposit scale and spread management
Nu Mexico, digital banks in high-rate markets
Nubank’s brand position is unusually powerful – both economically and emotional touch. It is not positioned as a premium bank; rather, it is positioning as an ally against complexity and abusive fees. This is a human touchpoint for LATAM customers; trust in financial institutions has historically been weaker, banking experiences have been often fee-heavy. The purple card identity and simple mobile interface created an icon, but the deeper advantage is behavioural data: starting with a small credit limit, observing repayment and spending, then expanding exposure to different financial products. This “low and grow” underwriting model is particularly relevant in thin-file markets.
The industry-specific risk is that brand trust can reverse rapidly with financial risk exposure – credit losses, fraud, customer service failures or regulatory dispute rise, as consumers are generally sensitive to financial institutions’ behaviour. As neobanks move from the initial stage of payments and cards into unsecured lending, their brand shifts from convenience to credit risk management. Nu’s 1Q2026 results show this tension: revenue exceeded $5bn and NII reached $3.25bn, but 15-90 day NPLs rose to 5.0%, while credit loss allowances increased with portfolio growth and mix5.

Framework Analysis

Porter’s Five Forces as below:
Force
Assessment
Investment implication
Threat of new entrants
Medium. App development is easy, but licences, funding, compliance, fraud controls, data history and customer trust are hard. Pix and open finance reduce infrastructure barriers but also raise regulatory scrutiny.
Scale and data history are increasingly defensible, particularly in credit.
Supplier power
Medium. Key suppliers are funding providers, card networks, cloud providers, core banking vendors and regulators. Deposit franchises reduce reliance on wholesale funding.
Nu’s deposit base lowers funding risk; cloud and regulatory dependence remain structural.
Buyer power
High in payments and deposits, lower in credit. Consumers can multi-home across apps, but primary-account behaviour and approved credit limits create stickiness.
Engagement, cross-sell and direct-deposit/salary relationships matter more than account count.
Threat of substitutes
High. Cash, Pix, wallets, incumbent bank apps, retail credit and informal lending all substitute for parts of the proposition.
Nu must own multiple daily-use cases, not just cards.
Rivalry
High. Incumbents are improving apps; Mercado Pago and PicPay compete in wallets; global fintechs target affluent customers.
Competitive advantage depends on cost-to-serve, underwriting and brand trust, not just UX.
Hamilton Helmer’s 7 Powers as below:
7 Powers lens
Applicability
Comment
Scale economies
Strong
Digital banks spread technology, compliance, fraud, servicing and brand spend over very large customer bases. Nu’s efficiency ratio reached 17.6% in Q1 2026, illustrating the operating leverage available at scale.
Network economies
Moderate
Banking is not a pure social network, but payments, merchant acceptance and Pix usage create ecosystem effects. Mercado Pago is stronger here because of commerce integration.
Counter-positioning
Strong historically
Neobanks attacked incumbents with no-fee, mobile-first products that would cannibalise legacy fee pools and branches. This remains strongest in Brazil and Mexico.
Switching costs
Moderate
Consumers can open multiple accounts, but switching a primary account, salary deposit, credit card limit, credit history and investment balances is harder.
Branding
Strong
Trust, simplicity and fairness are central to LATAM adoption. Nubank’s brand is a key intangible asset; Revolut’s brand is more global/premium; Mercado Pago’s is commerce utility.
Cornered resource
Moderate
Proprietary behavioural credit data, fraud data and local risk models can become a cornered resource. This is most valuable in thin-file credit markets.
Process power
Emerging
Fast product iteration, automated servicing and AI-led workflows may become process power if they are embedded in underwriting, collections and customer operations. Nu disclosed AI-driven engineering and testing productivity gains in Q1 2026.
Overall, Nu has evidence of at least four relevant powers: scale economies, counter-positioning, branding and proprietary data/process. The weaker areas are pure network effects and hard switching costs. This means the moat is real but operational rather than static; it must be renewed through superior risk selection, product breadth and trust preservation.

Industry Revenue and Expense Analysis

Revenue Model: Digital bank revenue is typically a mix of five different lines.
  • Net interest income (NII): spread between interest-earning assets and deposits/funding. n LATAM, high nominal rates and high consumer-credit spreads make this large, but asset quality is the binding constraint.
  • Interchange and card fees: attractive at early scale, but regulated and not enough alone to justify large market caps.
  • Payment and merchant fees: strongest for commerce-linked wallets and acquirers such as Mercado Pago.
  • Subscription / premium fees: more relevant in Europe and affluent segments than in mass-market LATAM. However, Nubank is also expanding premium offering (“Ultravioleta”)
  • Wealth, insurance and marketplace commissions: cross-sell revenue with lower capital intensity, but often slower to scale than credit.
Expense Model: Expense structure differs sharply from incumbent banks.
  • Branches, manual back-office processes and legacy IT are replaced by technology, cloud, fraud, customer service, marketing and credit losses. The digital model should show falling non-credit opex as a percentage of revenue as the platform scales.
  • The more important debate is not opex but credit cost: unsecured lending can expand ARPAC quickly, but it also increases provisions and capital needs.
  • In Q1 2026, Nu reported deposits of $42.4bn, a credit portfolio of $37.2bn, LDR of 58.3%, NIM of 21.1%, risk-adjusted NIM of 9.5%, and net income of $871m with 29% ROE. This is a useful benchmark for what successful LATAM neobank economics can look like after scale: high gross spreads, low cost-to-serve and high ROE, offset by visibly cyclical credit loss dynamics.
For industry modelling, the most important KPIs are:
  • Active customers (rather than registered customers);
  • ARPAC;
  • Cost-to-serve per active customer;
  • Deposit cost as a percentage of interbank rates;
  • Loan-to-deposit ratio;
  • NIM and risk-adjusted NIM;
  • 15-90 and 90+ NPLs;
  • Provision coverage;
  • Monthly purchase frequency;
  • Products per customer;
  • Contribution profit by cohort.
The analytical risk is to value neobanks on customer count alone. A better framework is customer scale x engagement x monetisation x risk-adjusted margin x capital intensity.
For NU specifically, the industry read-through is favourable but not risk-free. Brazil demonstrates that a digital bank can become a mass-market primary financial institution and produce bank-like earnings with software-like efficiency. Mexico and Colombia offer long growth runways, but cash usage, lower formal credit penetration, regulatory transition and less mature data history mean that the Brazil playbook cannot be copied mechanically. The investment debate should therefore focus on whether Nu’s cost and data advantages travel across LATAM faster than credit losses and regulatory complexity rise. ## Business Strategy
Latin America market expansion overview
### Company & Ownership Overview – Nu Holdings Ltd. Nu Holdings Ltd. is a Cayman Island incorporated and NYSE listed digital financial services holding company. Primarily the company operates through
Nubank
, one of the largest digital banking platforms globally, and the leading scaled neobank in LATAM. Founded in Brazil in 2013 by three co-founders, David Vélez, Cristina Junqueira and Edward Wible, the company began as a no-fee, app-first credit card issue; since then, expanded into a multi-product financial platform, spanning credit cards, digital accounts, deposits, personal loans, secured lending, SME banking, investments, insurance and marketplace style financial services.
Nu’s core operating markets are Brazil, Mexico and Colombia as current. Brazil remains the main profit engine and proof market; Mexico is the key second market with fast growth, Colombia is earlier stage but strategically relevant as a regional expansion. As of 1Q2026, Nu reported there are 135mn customers (globally), including more than 115mn in Brazil, over 15mn in Mexcio and nearly 5mn in Colombia. Management claims that Nu is now the largest private financial institution in Brazil, by customer count.
Ownership remains founder-influenced through a dual-class share structure. David Vélez, founder and CEO, retains significant voting control through Class B ordinary shares; Nu’s 2025 20-F summary states that he owns 88.3% of outstanding Class B ordinary shares, representing approximately 74.4% of voting power. The structure gives NU strategic continuity; but also creates governance concentration typical of founder-led technology platforms, rather than traditional banks where ownership is diversified.

Business Segments

Currently Nu reports their financials as single business segment. However as financial institution they report in product fee income and country level revenue as below (based on FY2025 revenue)
Customer Base
Deposit Balance
Product %
Brazil
86%
79%
NII
79%
Mexico
11%
15%
Card Fee
15%
Colombia
3%
6%
Late Fee
3%
Total
100%
100%
Insurance
0%
Other
2%
Total
100%

Pricing Strategy

Nu pricing strategy is not a “cheap bank”, but low-friction entry plus risk priced monetisation. Nu’s strategy is not simply undercutting banks on every product; it uses zero-to-low explicit fees to acquire primary relationships; then monetises through credit interest, interchange, float/spread, cross-sell and operating leverage. Across the three countries they operate, the common playbook is:
  1. Free or near-free entry product: no annual fee credit card, free digital account, app-first servicing, transparent pricing.
  1. High-yield deposits where the market is early or acquisition is strategy: Mexico and Colombia have used promotional/competitive deposit yields to pull balances into the ecosystem. Mexico’s Cajitas (“money boxes”) show 6.5% liquid yield, higher rates for frozen balances; Cajitas Turbo (boost) shows 13% promotional rate as of May 20266; Mexico’s central bank rate (BoM rate) is currently 6.5%. Colombia’s Cajitas reported up to 11.25% AER, starting from 9 April 2026.7 Colombia’s policy rate set by Central Bank of Colombia is 11.25%.
    1. A screenshot of a website AI-generated content may be incorrect.
A screenshot of a phone AI-generated content may be incorrect.
Figure 1. Nu Mexico Credit Interest for Cajita
  1. Credit pricing is not cheap, in absolute terms: Mexico’s credit card pages shows a zero annual fee; but a high average CAT (“Costo Anual Total”, total annual costs) of 145.8% and weighted annual fixed rate of 92.5%8, valid for the stated offer period. Colombia’s May 2026 credit card tariff sheet shows zero management fee and zero insurance; but a 28.17% AER credit interest rate – the proposition is no nuisance fees and transparent control, not low APR.
  1. Risk-based limit expansion: Nu gives small initial limits; then observes behaviour; then increases exposure. This allows them to price risk while reducing upfront selection risk. According to Nu release, NuFormer, its proprietary foundation model set is already used for credit card decisioning in Brazil and Mexico.
Nu’s pricing strategy is combined in three layers: incoming pricing, lock-in pricing and portfolio pricing – the three different pricing is related to layers of acquiring customer, deepening engagement and monetising deposits and lending (without relying on traditional banking fees).
  1. Incoming Pricing: Reducing friction, winning the first relationship
This is the “front door” strategy. Nu does not initially ask the customer to pay for the relationship. It uses zero-fee entry products and visibly attractive deposit yields to bring customers into the ecosystem. The three markets have slight difference where Brazil is more mature stage vs. Mexico and Colombia being earlier stage:
Markets
Incoming Price Mechanism
Strategic Role
Brazil
No-fee credit card, free digital account, Caixinhas (“Small Box”) with daily yield at 100% of CDI (Interbank CD) and Turbo up to 120% of CDI
Brazil is mature, so pricing is less about subsidy and more about keeping NU competitive versus banks and other digital challengers.
Mexico
No annual-fee credit card plus high-yield Cajitas: 6.50% liquid yield, 6.55%–6.80% frozen balances, and 13.00% Cajita Turbo promotional yield
Customer acquisition and trust-building in a market where NU is still scaling primary relationships.
Colombia
No-fee card positioning plus high-yield savings/CDT products
Early-stage land-grab; deposit pricing is used to create brand trust before full credit monetisation.
Key point is incoming price is cheap, or attractive to the customer; however not necessarily low-margin forever. Mexico is a clear example; credit card has no upfront annual fee, but the disclosed average CAT is 145.8% and weighted fixed annual rate is 92.5%, removing all nuisance fees while still preserving risk-based credit economics.
In Brazil, Nu’s incoming proposition is already less promotional. Caixinhas offer daily 100% yield on CDI, while Turbo can reach up to 120% CDI for customers meeting activity or subscription conditions. That is not a pure acquisition subsidy; it is a way to reward who bring the activity back to the ecosystem.
  1. Lock-in pricing: turn product usage into behavioural stickiness
Nu’s lock-in is not the old-bank version of lock-in through penalties, branch dependency or opaque fees. It is a behavioural attitude: habit, app control, goal-based saving, conditional yield, credit-limit progression and embedded payment behaviour.
  • Deposit-side Lock-in: the structure is usually Liquid savings → goal-based pockets/Caixinhas/Cajitas → frozen/term deposits → higher-yield conditional products. That means Nu can segment customers by liquidity preference. Customers who only need daily liquidity receive a lower rate; customers willing to freeze balances receive a slightly higher rate; customers who satisfy engagement conditions can access promotional or Turbo rates. In Mexico, Nu explicitly separates 24/7 Cajitas from frozen balances and Cajita Turbo, with higher rates for less-liquid or more conditional balances. In Colombia, CDT Nu plays the same lock-in role: custoomers can open fixed-term deposits from Cajitas, with a minimum deposit of COP 50k and 90/120-day terms. The point is not only funding; it makes Nu part of the customer’s savings goals, rather than a spending card.
  • Lending-side lock-in: On the lending side, lock-in comes from limit progression. NU starts with controlled exposure, observes behaviour, then expands limits or offers adjacent credit products. In Brazil, its card page explicitly points customers towards monitoring their limit and using saved money/investments to increase credit access through secured-limit structures. This is more of a change in customer psychology: the customer is encouraged to keep deposits, payments and credit behaviour inside Nu, given the improved access to credit over time.
  1. Portfolio pricing: monetise through spread, risk and mix
This is where the investment case sits; Nu’s model is not free banking. It is fee-light front end, spread-driven back end.
Deposit Portfolio Pricing
Deposit product type
Pricing logic
Economic purpose
Liquid account / Cajita
Competitive but usually lower than locked/promotional products
Bring balances in; maintain daily engagement
Goal-based pockets /Caixinhas
Similar or slightly enhanced yield, strong behavioural stickiness
Retain balances and increase app engagement
Frozen balances / CDT / Turbo
Higher yield, but conditional or term-based
Lock in funding and segment rate-sensitive customers
Brazil mature deposits
Benchmark-linked, activity-based enhancements
Defend engagement without overpaying for deposits
Mexico/Colombia deposits
More promotional/high-yield
Acquire trust and scale in newer markets
NU’s funding cost is not simply “pay the highest rate”. In FY2025, total deposits were US$41.9bn, up 29% YoY, while cost of funding was 87% of interbank rates. That means NU was still funding below the broad interbank benchmark despite offering attractive visible deposit products.
Lending portfolio pricing
Lending product
Pricing logic
Strategic role
Credit card
No annual fee, but high revolving/financing rates
Acquisition product plus high-yield revolving asset
Personal loans
Risk-based pricing, usually lower than card revolving but still high yield
Monetisation of known customers
Secured/guaranteed credit
Lower-risk expansion using collateral/deposits
Safer credit growth and limit-building
Instalment/BNPL-style features
Convenience pricing embedded in app
Increases credit usage without branch friction
Brazil illustrates the mature version: Nubank’s disclosed card interest range includes 2.75%–19.99% per month for revolving credit and 0.99%–19.75% per month for instalment of the bill. Mexico shows the expansion-market version: no annual card fee, but an average CAT of 145.8%; personal loans show an average CAT of 88.2% and weighted fixed annual rate of 84.8%. Colombia is more regulated/earlier-stage, but its May 2026 card tariff sheet still shows zero handling fee and zero insurance, alongside a 28.17% E.A. credit interest rate in the simulation.
NU’s portfolio strategy is to use a large, relatively low-cost deposit base to fund credit card receivables and loans. The company gives up traditional banking fees at the front end, but recovers economics through card interest, loan interest, interchange, late fees and balance-sheet spread.

Market and Competitor Analysis

Brazil: mature market, pricing power comes from scale and lower cost-to-serve
Product & pricing posture: Brazil is Nu’s core profit pool. The pricing strategy evolved to the level where it is now less aggressive deposit subsidise and more about expanding share of wallet across card, personal loans, secured lending, investments, insurance and adjacent products.
The core consumer offer is:
Product
NU pricing stance
Strategic purpose
Credit card
No annual fee, app control
Mass acquisition and engagement
Digital account / Pix
Low or no explicit transaction fees
Daily-use relationship
Deposits / savings
Around benchmark-linked yield, not always best-in-market
Retention and funding
Personal loans / secured loans
Risk-based pricing
Main profit engine
Investments / insurance / marketplace
Competitive, low-friction
Cross-sell and ARPAC expansion
Nu has become Brazil’s largest private financial institution by customer count; with over 115mn customers in Brazil by March 2026. The scale of this size changes the pricing power; it no longer needs to win every customer by squeezing in the margin of yield between savings and lending.
Competitor analysis:
Category
Names
Advantages
Weakness
Incumbent Banks
Itaú, Bradesco, Santander Brasil, Banco do Brasil, Caixa
Payroll, mortgages, SME banking, affluent relationships, corporate banking and trust
Legacy cost structure, weaker UX
Digital banks
Banco Inter, C6, PicPay, Mercado Pago, Neon
Inter:broader in marketplace/investments C6: premium/card-led strategy PicPay & Mercado Pago: wallet/payment-commerce led
Brand, scale, data, primary relationship depth
Conclusion: No longer a pure disruption pricing story; more of an operating leverage and credit underwriting story. Nu is available to keep explicit fees low, since it monetises through balance-sheet products and very low unit servicing costs.
Mexico: customer acquisition is deposit led; the real battle is cash and trust.
Product & pricing posture: Mexico is the most strategically important expansion market; Nu is still using more aggressive pricing to penetrate into the market, build trust and habit.
The core consumer offer is:
Product
NU pricing stance
Strategic purpose
Cuenta Nu / Cajitas
High headline yield versus traditional banks
Acquire deposits and app engagement
Cajita Turbo
Promotional 13.00% fixed annual rate, with conditions/validity disclosed
Marketing hook and balance growth
Credit card
No annual fee, but high CAT / APR
Monetise underbanked credit risk
Cash access
OXXO partnership
Reduce cash-economy friction
The strategy is rational: Mexico is a low-trust, cash-heavy market; but the flip side is it is still a high-yield, easy-to-understand savings product being the faster acquisition wedge than credit alone. Nu partnered with OXXO to expand their access to cash withdrawals and deposits across Mexcio (as part of localisation); acknowledging that cash remains structurally important.
Competitor analysis:
Category
Names
Advantages
Weakness
Incumbent Banks
BBVA México, Banorte, Santander, Citibanamex, HSBC, Scotiabank
Payroll accounts, branches, corporate relationships and trust
Deposit rates, weaker UX
Fintech
Stori, Klar, Ualá, Mercado Pago, DiDi, Finsus
Direct competitor, growing phase; strong card/credit access
NPL ratio rapid increase
Fintech
Revolut
Full operations in Mexico, 15% deposit rate (up to MXN 25k), aiming 2mn clients
Fintech
MercadoPago
Commerce, wallet, merchant data and payment frequency data; stronger transaction ecosystem
Nu having stronger banking brand
Conclusion: Mexico is a subsidised land-grab phase. High deposit yields are not the final economics. The investment question is whether NU can convert promotional deposits into primary account behaviour, then into credit, payments and cross-sell before funding cost normalises.
Colombia: earlier-stage, high-yield savings plus no-fee card
Product & pricing posture: Colombia is smaller and earlier than Mexico. NU is using a similar but more cautious version of the playbook.
The core consumer offer is:
Product
NU pricing stance
Strategic purpose
Cuenta Nu / Cajitas
High-yield digital savings
Acquire trust and balances
Credit card
0 management fee, 0 insurance, transparent rate disclosure
Entry credit product
CDT / term deposit
Competitive fixed-yield savings
Lock balances and deepen relationship
Cuenta Nu was launched as a no-hidden-fee, free savings account with unlimited transfers and an initial 13% annual effective yield. The April 2026 update reported Cajitas at up to 11.25% E.A., with daily interest and liquidity.
Competitor analysis:
Category
Names
Advantages
Incumbent Banks
Bancolombia, Davivienda, Banco de Bogotá, BBVA Colombia
Deposit base, payroll flows, merchant relationships and perceived safety
Neobanks
Nequi, DaviPlata, MOVii, Lulo Bank, Ualá, RappiPay, Pibank
Direct competitor, growing phase; strong card/credit access
Conclusion: Colombia is still brand-building and deposit acquisition. NU’s pricing is attractive, but the market has strong wallet incumbents. The key question is whether NU becomes a primary account or remains a high-yield savings/card app.

SWOT Analysis

Strength
Scale-led digital banking franchise. NU ended FY2025 with 131m customers , adding 17m during the year. Brazil alone reached 113m customers , representing 62% of the adult population, with an 86% activity rate, making NU the largest private financial institution in Brazil by customer count. ; Low-cost operating model. Monthly cost to serve per active customer remained only US$0.8 , while Q4’25 efficiency ratio improved to 19.9% . This gives NU structural room to offer fee-light products while still monetising through credit, deposits and interchange. ; Deposit-funded lending flywheel. Total deposits reached US$41.9bn , up 29% YoY, while total credit portfolio expanded 40% YoY to US$32.7bn . Available funding of US$38.8bn was approximately twice the net credit portfolio, giving NU liquidity headroom for further loan growth. ; Profitability already proven at scale. FY2025 revenue reached US$16.3bn , net income reached US$2.9bn , and ROE reached 33% , showing that NU is no longer only a customer-acquisition fintech but an already-profitable retail financial platform. ; AI-enabled underwriting advantage. NU deployed nuFormer in Brazil credit-card underwriting, supporting the largest quarterly gain in credit-card market share in ten quarters, with planned expansion into Brazil lending and Mexico credit cards.
Weaknesses
Brazil remains the profit and scale anchor. NU’s strongest franchise is still Brazil, where it has deep penetration and high activity; Mexico and Colombia are growing quickly but are not yet as mature in monetisation or product breadth. ; Credit-risk intensive earnings model. NU’s earnings are materially tied to credit cards and consumer lending. FY2025 interest income from credit cards was US$4.6bn and from loans was US$4.8bn, but expected credit loss expense also reached US$4.2bn, up from US$3.2bn in FY2024. ; Deposit pricing pressure in expansion markets. NU’s funding model depends heavily on deposits, but customer acquisition in Mexico and Colombia requires attractive deposit yields. FY2025 interest expense on deposits increased to US$3.9bn from US$2.3bn in FY2024. ; Short-duration funding profile. NU’s deposit franchise is the main funding source, but a large portion of deposits remains contractually short-term or redeemable, requiring active liquidity management and a liquidity cushion on the asset side. ; Still card and loan-heavy. Fee income is growing, but FY2025 fee and commission income was still mainly driven by credit/prepaid card income and late fees, leaving NU’s monetisation more exposed to credit and payment-cycle dynamics than a more diversified bank.
Opportunities
Mexico conversion from card issuer to primary bank. NU already serves around 15% of Mexico’s adult populationand is the leading issuer of new credit cards. The next upside is converting high-yield deposit and card customers into primary banking, lending and broader financial relationships. ; Colombia early-stage scaling. NU surpassed 4m customers in Colombia, and the expansion of its credit-card portfolio nearly tripled approval capacity. This creates optionality if NU can replicate Brazil/Mexico-style engagement in a less mature market. ; Secured, payroll and SME credit expansion. NU launched payroll loan modalities in Brazil and expanded SME credit tools in FY2025. Secured loans already reached US$2.7bn, giving NU a path to grow lending with potentially lower loss intensity than unsecured credit. ; Cross-sell and ARPAC expansion. ARPAC reached US$15 in Q4’25, up from US$11.1 one year earlier. With over 100 new products and features launched in FY2025, NU has room to deepen monetisation per customer without relying only on customer growth. ; Platformisation and AI reuse across markets. NU is building country-agnostic infrastructure and expanding AI use cases across underwriting, cross-selling, notifications and service quality. If reusable infrastructure works, incremental market expansion should become more efficient over time.
Threats
Incumbent bank and ecosystem competition. In Brazil, NU competes with large incumbent banks and digital challengers; in Mexico and Colombia, it faces both banks and fintech ecosystems. Mexico is especially competitive because players such as Mercado Pago, Klar, Stori, Ualá, OXXO-linked services and others compete for deposits, cards and payments. ; Deposit-rate war risk. Mexico and Colombia customer acquisition is partly driven by attractive savings yields. If competitors continue to bid aggressively for deposits, NU may face margin compression or customer churn when promotional rates normalise. ; Credit cycle normalisation. Q4’25 15–90 day NPL was 4.1% and 90+ NPL was 6.6% . If unemployment, rates or consumer leverage deteriorate in Brazil, Mexico or Colombia, NU’s credit-loss line could rise quickly because the book is consumer-credit heavy. ; Regulatory and funding-cost burden. NU’s Q4’25 risk-adjusted NIM was affected by an extraordinary contribution to Prosofipo , the Mexican sector-wide deposit protection fund. More bank-like regulation, capital rules and deposit protection costs could dilute part of the neobank cost advantage. ; Execution risk from rapid product and market expansion. NU is simultaneously scaling Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, SME, payroll, secured credit, AI and platform infrastructure. Management itself notes that platformisation and strategic investment may create near-term upward pressure on the efficiency ratio.

Investment Thesis

Thesis 1. Growth Duration is Underestimated - Brazil Has Proven the Model, Mexico Is the Next Curve
  • Brazil has validated the playbook. NU reached 131m global customers in FY2025, with Brazil at 113m customers and 62% adult penetration, showing that the model has already moved from customer acquisition into monetisation.
  • Mexico sits earlier in the same curve. Mexico reached around 15% adult penetration and became the leading issuer of new credit cards, but remains far behind Brazil in product depth, credit penetration and ARPAC maturity.
  • Colombia remains early-stage optionality. Colombia exceeded 4m customers in FY2025, but monetisation is still nascent and should be treated as long-duration growth rather than near-term earnings support.
    • A screenshot of a graph AI-generated content may be incorrect.
  • Market is treating NU as a mature Brazil neobank. The investment case is that Brazil is no longer the whole story; the next phase is the repeatability of the Brazil monetisation curve across Mexico and, later, Colombia.
NU is no longer simply a Brazilian digital bank growth story. Brazil has already proven the core model: low-friction onboarding, app-based engagement, deposit capture, credit expansion and rising monetisation over time. By FY2025, NU had 131m customers globally, including 113m in Brazil, and had become the largest private financial institution in Brazil by customer count. The key point is not just customer size, but maturity: Brazil is now entering the phase where customer growth matters less than ARPAC, cross-sell and credit depth.
Mexico is the more important debate. It is still structurally earlier than Brazil, but the entry pattern looks similar: credit-card led acquisition, high engagement, deposit build-out and gradual lending expansion. In FY2025, NU stated that it served around 15% of Mexico’s adult population and was the leading issuer of new credit cards. The market risk is that investors over-discount Mexico because current monetisation is lower than Brazil; the bull case is that this is exactly what Brazil looked like before product depth and cohort ageing lifted revenue per customer.
Colombia should not be forced into the near-term earnings story. It is still early, with over 4m customers and expanding card approval capacity, but the market remains less mature and more wallet-led. The right framing is optionality: Colombia is valuable because NU’s fixed technology stack, brand and underwriting infrastructure can be reused, but the proof of monetisation still needs time.
The thesis is therefore about duration, not just growth. Brazil proves the economics; Mexico tests repeatability; Colombia extends the runway. If Mexico follows even a partial Brazil-style path, the market is too short in its implied growth duration.
Thesis 2. Four Costs Moat - Structural Low-Cost Advantage Compounds Through the Credit Engine
  • Cost to acquire is structurally lower. NU’s digital-first model allows customer acquisition at a fraction of branch-based incumbents, supporting profitable scaling even in lower-income or thin-file segments.
  • Cost to serve is structurally lower. FY2025 cost to serve remained around US$0.8 per active customer per month, while efficiency improved materially as revenue scaled.
  • Cost of funding is improving through deposits. NU ended FY2025 with US$41.9bn of deposits, up 29% YoY, giving it a self-funded base for credit expansion rather than relying primarily on wholesale funding.
  • Cost of risk is managed through data, not avoided. NU is still exposed to consumer credit risk, but the underwriting advantage comes from transaction, payment, deposit and app-behaviour data accumulated across a large active base. NU’s advantage is not just that it is digital. The moat is that all four cost lines improve together: acquisition, servicing, funding and risk. A branch-based bank may compete on app design or deposit pricing, but it cannot easily replicate NU’s lower structural cost base without undermining its existing distribution model. NU’s low-friction acquisition model drives customer growth; customer growth creates more data; data improves underwriting and cross-sell; cross-sell increases ARPAC; higher ARPAC then supports further reinvestment in product and risk infrastructure.
    • A screenshot of a graph AI-generated content may be incorrect.
The cost-to-serve advantage is already visible in FY2025 numbers. NU disclosed a monthly average cost to serve per active customer of US$0.8 and a Q4’25 efficiency ratio of 19.9%, supported by operating leverage from higher engagement and monetisation. This is the core reason NU can maintain fee-light products and still produce bank-like profitability.
Funding is the second leg. NU’s deposit base reached US$41.9bn in FY2025, while its total credit portfolio reached US$32.7bn. This creates a deposit-funded lending flywheel: deposits lower funding pressure; lower funding pressure supports credit expansion; credit expansion increases revenue per active customer; higher revenue improves profitability and reinvestment capacity.
The risk is that this model is not immune to the credit cycle. NU’s FY2025 financial statements show loans to customers of US$10.9bn, including US$2.7bn of secured loans, while expected credit losses increased as the book expanded. That means the moat should not be described as “no credit risk”. The better wording is that NU has a data-led risk advantage, allowing it to underwrite customers that incumbents either reject, under-serve or price less efficiently.
The conclusion: NU’s moat is not one cost advantage, but a system of cost advantages. The model works because low CAC, low servicing cost, deposit funding and behavioural underwriting reinforce one another.
Thesis 3. ARPAC Runway - Monetisation Comes From Cohort Ageing, Not Just New Customers
  • Customer growth is no longer the only driver. NU already has 131m customers; the next earnings leg depends on converting existing users into higher-value relationships.
  • ARPAC expands as cohorts mature. The product path is account, card, deposits, personal loan, investments, insurance and SME services. Time increases product penetration and revenue per active customer.
  • Credit is the main ARPAC engine. Credit cards and loans remain the largest monetisation drivers, with FY2025 interest income from credit cards and loans forming the core of revenue generation.
  • Operating leverage magnifies ARPAC gains. Because incremental servicing cost is low, each dollar of ARPAC expansion has high flow-through potential if credit losses remain controlled. The market is too focused on headline customer growth. NU does not need another 100m customers to compound earnings; it needs existing customers to behave more like mature Brazil cohorts. The customer journey is gradual: first account or card, then deposit balance, then credit limit expansion, then personal loan, then investments, insurance or SME products. This is why ARPAC is more important than raw customer count at this stage.
    • A close up of a number AI-generated content may be incorrect.
FY2025 already shows that this is happening. NU ended the year with 131m customers, Q4 ARPAC reached US$15, and the company launched over 100 products and features during the year. This means monetisation is being driven not just by more users, but by broader product usage within the existing base.
Credit remains the primary driver. NU’s FY2025 financial statements show interest income from credit cards of US$4.6bn and interest income from loans of US$4.8bn, versus deposit interest expense of US$3.9bn. That mix makes the strategy clear: acquire cheaply through simple, fee-light products; retain balances through deposits and app engagement; then monetise through risk-priced credit and lending spread.
The ARPAC thesis is strongest in Brazil but most valuable in Mexico. Brazil shows what mature engagement can produce. Mexico is earlier, but if users move from card-only to account, deposits and lending, the revenue curve can rise without equivalent incremental CAC. That is the key point: ARPAC expansion is not a new acquisition story. It is a cohort ageing and cross-sell story.
The clean version is: NU scales earnings through depth, not just breadth. Customer count built the platform; ARPAC expansion monetises it.

Valuation

Financial Summary

Metric($mn, except per share / customer data)
2024A
2025A
2026E
2027E
2028E
Net Revenue
8,422
10,830
14,418
17,976
23,061
Net Interest Income
6,796
8,856
11,546
14,510
18,899
Provisions
(3,169)
(4,205)
(5,545)
(6,836)
(8,582)
Non-Interest Expense
(2,458)
(2,753)
(3,390)
(4,020)
(4,886)
Adjusted Net Profit
1,972
2,869
4,065
5,281
7,117
EPS ($)
0.41
0.59
0.83
1.07
1.44
Total Customers (mn)
114.3
131.0
145.6
161.1
177.5
Monthly ARPAC ($)
11.3
13.3
15.4
17.7
20.2
Deposits
28,855
41,925
51,534
62,760
75,541
Net Loans
17,581
27,689
33,924
43,464
55,565
Net Interest Margin
18.2%
16.2%
16.7%
17.0%
17.9%
Efficiency Ratio
29.2%
25.4%
23.5%
22.4%
21.2%
CET1 Ratio
14.7%
13.0%
14.9%
14.8%
14.3%
RORWA
10.0%
11.2%
11.4%
11.7%
12.4%
FY2025 is the first mature read of Nu’s post-scale profitability. The model uses Net Revenue, defined as Net Interest Income plus non-interest income net of transactional expense, which differs from Nu’s official headline FY2025 revenue disclosure of US$16.3bn. The model’s FY2025 net revenue of US$10.8bn is therefore a cleaner bank-style revenue measure for valuation purposes, rather than a direct headline revenue figure. Nu reported FY2025 revenue of US$16.3bn, net income of US$2.9bn, 131m customers, US$41.9bn deposits and US$32.7bn credit portfolio at year-end.
The core financial inflection is not customer count alone. Net revenue is forecast to grow from US$10.8bn in FY2025A to US$23.1bn in FY2028E, driven by rising ARPAC, deeper lending penetration and higher deposit-funded credit utilisation. Adjusted net profit increases from US$2.9bn to US$7.1bn over the same period, while the efficiency ratio improves from 25.4% to 21.2%, reflecting operating leverage from a largely digital cost base.
The balance sheet supports the earnings curve. Deposits increase from US$41.9bn in FY2025A to US$75.5bn in FY2028E, while net loans rise from US$27.7bn to US$55.6bn. Loans/deposits therefore rise from 66.0% in FY2025A to 73.6% in FY2028E, implying that Nu is gradually converting its deposit franchise into earning assets without immediately exhausting funding capacity.
Financial ModellingAssumptions Adopted
  • Revenue modelling: A bank-style revenue build has been adopted, using Net Interest Income plus non-interest income net of transactional expense. Forecast growth is driven by customer growth, monthly active customers, ARPAC expansion, loan book growth and deposit-funded balance sheet deployment. Headline revenue is not used as the main valuation revenue line because Nu’s economics are better captured through NII, fee income, provisions and efficiency ratio.
  • Customer growth: Total customers are projected from 131.0m in FY2025A to 177.5m in FY2028E. Brazil growth is modelled to decelerate as penetration matures, from 113.0m customers in FY2025A to 138.4m in FY2028E. Mexico remains the main growth engine, increasing from 14.0m to 29.6m, while Colombia rises from 4.0m to 9.5m over the same period.
    • Brazil: Growth slows from high-penetration expansion to monetisation, with forecast customer growth stepping down from 8.0% in FY2026E to 6.0% by FY2028E.
    • Mexico: Customer growth remains structurally higher, forecast at 30.0% in FY2026E, 28.3% in FY2027E and 26.7% in FY2028E, reflecting earlier-stage penetration.
    • Colombia: Growth is modelled from a low base, with customers increasing to 9.5m by FY2028E, but Colombia is treated as optionality rather than near-term core profit driver.
  • Activity and ARPAC: Monthly active customers grow from 109.3m in FY2025A to 150.7m in FY2028E, with activity rate improving from 83.4% to 84.9%. Monthly ARPAC is forecast to increase from US$13.3 in FY2025A to US$20.2 in FY2028E, driven by product penetration, credit usage and cohort ageing.
  • Net Interest Income: NII is projected from US$8.9bn in FY2025A to US$18.9bn in FY2028E. The main driver is growth in credit card receivables and customer loans, partly offset by deposit funding costs. The model assumes NIM stabilises and gradually improves from 16.2% in FY2025A to 17.9% in FY2028E, rather than assuming a straight-line margin expansion.
  • Credit book: Net loans grow from US$27.7bn in FY2025A to US$55.6bn in FY2028E. Credit card receivables and customer loans remain the key monetisation assets, while secured lending provides a lower-risk growth channel. Nu’s FY2025 filing separately disclosed loans to customers of US$10.9bn, including US$2.7bn of secured loans, confirming the shift towards a broader lending mix.
  • Provisions: Provision expense is modelled to rise from US$4.2bn in FY2025A to US$8.6bn in FY2028E, broadly in line with credit book growth. This avoids overstating profitability by assuming that incremental lending scales without corresponding credit cost. The model therefore treats underwriting advantage as a margin/risk selection benefit, not as a removal of credit-cycle risk.
  • Operating expenses: Non-interest expense increases from US$2.8bn in FY2025A to US$4.9bn in FY2028E, but grows slower than revenue. Cost to serve is held broadly stable at US$0.8 per active customer per month, allowing the efficiency ratio to improve from 25.4% to 21.2% by FY2028E. This is the main operating leverage assumption.
  • Deposits and funding: Deposits are projected to grow from US$41.9bn in FY2025A to US$75.5bn in FY2028E. The model assumes Nu remains primarily deposit-funded, with loan/deposit ratio increasing from 66.0% to 73.6%. This reflects balance sheet utilisation, not a wholesale funding-led growth model.

Valuation Parameters

Parameter
Value
Rationale & Justification / Source
Valuation Method
Residual Income Model
More appropriate for a bank-like fintech where equity capital, credit losses and ROE drive value
Shares Outstanding
4,855.7m
Model input
Risk-free Rate
3.95%
US rate used in model, aligned with USD valuation framework
Equity Beta
1.11
Market beta input
Blume-adjusted Beta
1.055
50/50 adjustment towards 1.0
Equity Risk Premium
8.05%
Weighted ERP input
Tax Rate
25.7%
Effective tax rate used across forecast
Cost of Equity
12.43%
Rf + adjusted beta × ERP
Terminal Growth
5.5%
LatAm nominal growth-style assumption
Base RIM Target Price
$18.46
Residual income valuation output
Bear Case
$11.30
Selic/macro/credit stress case
Bull Case
$23.80
Higher ROE and stronger expansion case
Weighted Target Price
$18.34
Current model-weighted output
Residual Income Model is adopted as the primary valuation method. For Nu, a conventional DCF is less clean because deposits, loans, provisions and capital are part of the operating model rather than incidental financing items. RIM directly captures whether Nu can generate returns above its cost of equity. In the model, forecast net income rises from US$4.1bn in FY2026E to US$9.5bn in FY2029E, while excess return increases from US$2.7bn to US$6.9bn, supporting the base RIM target price of US$18.46.
The model uses 12.43% cost of equity, based on a 3.95% risk-free rate, 1.055 adjusted beta and 8.05% equity risk premium. Terminal growth is set at 5.5%, which is aggressive for a mature bank but more defensible for Nu if Mexico and Colombia remain in a high-growth monetisation phase.
Residual Income
*** 2026F***
2027F
2028F
2029F
2030F (T)
Net Income (after one-off)
4,065
5,281
7,117
9,521
Beginning CSE
11,322
13,820
17,049
21,379
k(e)
12.4%
12.4%
12.4%
12.4%
12.4%
Residual Earnings (NI - kE x Beg. CSE)
2,657
3,562
4,997
6,863
7,241
PV(RE2026)
PV(RE2027)
PV(RE2028)
PV(RE2029)
PV(RE2030)
PV of RE
2,363
2,818
3,515
4,295
65,340
CSE at t0
11,322
Equity Value at t0
89,653
Shares Outstanding (mn)
4,856
Estimated Share Price
$18.46
** **

Relative Valuation

Method
Peer Benchmark / Input
Implied TP
Upside vs. Entry
Residual Income Model
Ke 12.43%, g 5.5%
$18.46
+27.2%
Forward PEG, median
0.53x 2026E PEG
$16.81
+15.9%
Forward PEG, average
0.83x 2026E PEG
$25.99
+79.1%
Weighted Target Price
80% RIM / 20% PEG
$18.34
+26.4%
Note: Trading multiples are calculated as current enterprise value divided by FY2026E EBITDA, unless otherwise stated. EV includes market capitalisation, net debt, lease liabilities and other enterprise-value adjustments, less cash and financial assets.

Sensitivity Analysis

kE/g
** **
** **
** **
g
** **
** **
** **
Adjustment
$18.46
2.5%
3.5%
4.5%
5.5%
6.5%
7.5%
8.5%
1.0%
** **
9.4%
$21.45
$24.32
$28.34
$34.42
$44.63
$65.41
$130.67
** **
10.4%
$18.38
$20.41
$23.12
$26.93
$32.67
$42.33
$61.97
** **
11.4%
$16.02
$17.50
$19.42
$21.98
$25.57
$31.00
$40.12
kE
12.4%
$14.13
$15.25
$16.66
$18.46
$20.88
$24.28
$29.40
** **
13.4%
$12.60
$13.47
$14.52
$15.85
$17.55
$19.83
$23.04
** **
14.4%
$11.34
$12.01
$12.83
$13.83
$15.07
$16.68
$18.83
** **
15.4%
$10.27
$10.81
$11.45
$12.22
$13.16
$14.33
$15.85

Investment Risk & Catalysts

Risks

The key risks are not cosmetic. Nu’s investment case depends on whether its deposit-funded, low-cost digital banking model can sustain high ROE while scaling credit in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia. Credit quality, deposit pricing, regulation and execution in Mexico are the main downside variables over the forecast period.
Risk
Category
Direction
Assessment & Mitigation
Credit cycle deterioration
Macro / Credit
Down
Nu’s earnings are increasingly credit-sensitive as the portfolio scales. FY2025 total credit portfolio reached US$32.7bn , up 40% YoY, while 90+ day NPL stood at 6.6% . • Provision expense is therefore a structural cost of growth, not a one-off item. ; Mitigation: high-frequency behavioural data, credit-card repayment history, deposit flows and app engagement improve underwriting; secured loans and payroll-style lending can gradually reduce loss intensity. ( Nu International )
Deposit-rate competition
Funding / Competition
Down
Nu’s funding model depends on customer deposits. FY2025 deposits reached US$41.9bn , but expansion markets such as Mexico and Colombia still require visibly attractive yields to acquire and retain balances. • If fintechs and banks continue bidding for deposits, funding cost could rise faster than lending yield. ; Mitigation: Nu’s cost of funding remained below interbank rates in FY2025, and rising product usage should reduce reliance on pure rate-led acquisition over time. ( Nu International )
Mexico execution risk
Execution
Down
Mexico is the largest upside driver but remains earlier in monetisation than Brazil. Nu has strong card issuance momentum, but lending, deposits and primary account usage still need to mature. • A slower conversion from card users to deposit/lending customers would reduce the growth-duration thesis. ; Mitigation: Nu already served around 15% of Mexico’s adult population by FY2025 and has proven a similar product-led expansion path in Brazil. ( Nu International )
Regulatory cost creep
Regulatory
Down
As Nu becomes more bank-like, it may face more bank-like capital, liquidity, deposit insurance and consumer protection costs. • Mexico’s sector-wide deposit protection costs and Brazil’s prudential framework can gradually reduce part of the neobank cost advantage. ; Mitigation: Nu ended FY2025 with strong profitability, ROE of 33% , and a scale cost advantage, giving it capacity to absorb higher compliance costs better than smaller fintechs. ( Nu International )
Brazil concentration
Geographic
Down
Brazil remains the core profit pool. If Brazilian consumer credit, regulation or competition deteriorates, consolidated earnings would be disproportionately affected. • Mexico and Colombia are growing, but they are not yet as mature as Brazil in monetisation. ; Mitigation: Brazil is already highly penetrated and profitable, while Mexico and Colombia extend the growth runway rather than replacing the Brazil thesis immediately. ( Nu International )
Valuation de-rating
Market / Multiple
Down
Nu trades at a premium to traditional banks because the market capitalises high ROE, growth duration and fintech-style scalability. • If ARPAC growth slows, credit costs rise or Mexico monetisation disappoints, the stock could de-rate even if absolute earnings continue to grow. ; Mitigation: RIM-based valuation anchors the target on excess ROE rather than assuming a pure fintech multiple expansion.

Catalysts

Several re-rating triggers require Nu to do little more than keep proving the FY2025 model. The asymmetry is deliberate: the thesis does not depend on a new business line suddenly working; it depends on market recognition that Brazil is already profitable at scale, while Mexico and Colombia remain earlier in the same monetisation curve. FY2025 ended with 131m customers, US$41.9bn deposits, US$2.9bn net income and 33% ROE, providing the base case from which these catalysts should be judged.
Catalyst
NT/LT
Expected Timing
Significance
Quarterly earnings beat / guidance upgrade
Near-term
Rolling 2026
First recurring check on whether FY2025 profitability can compound without deterioration in credit quality. ; Watch ARPAC, NII growth, provision expense, NPL trend, efficiency ratio and deposit cost. ; Any beat driven by ARPAC or efficiency, rather than only customer growth, is a direct re-rating trigger.
Mexico monetisation acceleration
Near-term
2026-2027
• Mexico is the largest growth-duration proof point. Nu already served around 15% of Mexico’s adult population by FY2025, but monetisation is still far behind Brazil. ( Nu International ) ; Watch credit penetration, deposit growth, loan take-up and ARPAC uplift. ; A visible move from “customer acquisition” to “primary banking relationship” would support a higher terminal growth assumption.
ARPAC step-up from existing users
Near-term
Rolling 2026
Q4’25 ARPAC reached US$15, showing that monetisation is already rising within the existing customer base. ( Nu International ) ; This is the cleanest catalyst because it does not require another customer boom. ; If ARPAC rises while cost to serve remains low, earnings growth should outpace customer growth.
Credit quality resilience
Near-term
Rolling 2026
Nu’s credit portfolio is expanding rapidly, so the market will discount growth unless NPLs and provisions remain controlled. ; Watch 15-90 day NPL, 90+ NPL, provision expense and coverage ratio. ; Stable asset quality while lending grows would validate the underwriting and data advantage thesis.
Loan-to-deposit deployment
Near / Medium-term
2026-2028
Nu has a large deposit base relative to its credit portfolio; the upside is converting under-deployed deposits into higher-yielding credit assets. ; Watch LDR, NIM and cost of deposits. ; Re-rating comes if Nu increases balance sheet utilisation without funding-cost or credit-loss pressure.
Secured / payroll lending mix shift
Medium-term
2026-2028
• A shift towards secured, payroll-linked or lower-loss lending would reduce the volatility of Nu’s credit-heavy earnings base. ; This matters because the bear case is not revenue growth; it is provision growth. ; A safer lending mix could justify a higher sustainable ROE and lower risk premium.
Colombia scaling proof
Medium-term
2027+
Colombia is not yet core to valuation, but it is useful proof that the Brazil/Mexico playbook is repeatable beyond one large expansion market. • Watch customer growth, deposit adoption, card approval capacity and early ARPAC trajectory. ; Positive data would extend growth duration but should not be over-weighted in the near-term case.
US bank launch optionality
Long-term
2028+
Nu received conditional OCC approval to establish Nubank N.A. in January 2026. ( Nu International ) ; This should be treated as option value, not base-case earnings. ; Any credible product launch, early customer acquisition data or Hispanic-market traction could add a new optionality premium.

Disclosure & Important Notes

This report has been prepared as an independent equity research publication and is intended for informational, educational and academic purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a solicitation to buy or sell securities, or an offer of any kind. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult a qualified financial adviser before making investment decisions. All financial estimates are the author’s own projections and are subject to material uncertainty. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Currency: all estimates in US Dollars (USD) unless otherwise stated. Entry price as of 12 April 2026.
Disclaimer
This report has been prepared solely for academic and educational purposes. It does not constitute investment advice, financial advice, or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. The analysis is based on publicly available information believed to be reliable, but no representation is made as to its accuracy or completeness. Any opinions, forecasts, or valuation estimates are those of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. The author does not hold any position in the securities discussed. This report is prepared in a personal academic capacity and is not associated with, endorsed by, or representative of any investment adviser, financial institution, current employer, or other organisation. Readers should conduct their own independent research and seek professional advice before making any investment decision.


  1. Brazil’s Pix set for next leap with launch of recurring payments, Reuters, 4 June 2024, Accessed on 10 April 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-pix-set-next-leap-with-launch-recurring-payments-2025-06-04/↩︎
  1. Competition in Mobile Payment Services – Note by Mexico, OECD, 18 June 2025, Accessed on 10 April 2026. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2025)12/en/pdf↩︎
  1. Brazil’s Nubank partners with convenience store Oxxo to expand in Mexico, Reuters, 13 January 2025, Accessed on 10 April 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-nubank-partners-with-convenience-store-oxxo-expand-mexico-2025-01-13/↩︎
  1. 5-Bank Asset Concentration for Brazil, FRED(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Accessed on 16 April 2026, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOI06BRA156NWDB↩︎
  1. Nu Holdings Ltd. Reports First Quarter 2026 Financial Results, Nu Holdings, 14 May 2026.↩︎
  1. Cajitas Nu te ayudan a crecer tu dinero hasta 13% anual, Nu Mexico, Accessed on 23 May 2026, https://nu.com.mx/cuenta/rendimientos/↩︎
  1. Nu Colombia mejora sus cuentas de ahorro: nueva tasa y cómo acceder al beneficio, Enter.Co, 9 April 2026, Accessed on 23 May 2026. https://www.enter.co/colombia/nu-colombia-mejora-sus-cuentas-de-ahorro-nueva-tasa-y-como-acceder-al-beneficio/↩︎
  1. La tarjeta de credito sin anualidad ni cobros sorpresa - Respaldada por Mastercard ®, Nu Mexico, Accessed on 23 May 2026, https://nu.com.mx/credito/↩︎