Coupang Inc. (NYSE: CPNG)
🛒

Coupang Inc. (NYSE: CPNG)

Tags
2025
Stock Pitch Competition
NYSE
Korea
Post-Mortem
Initiation Report
Published
October 18, 2025
Author
Christopher Hwang
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NB: This note has been made for the sole purpose of pitching in the Stock Pitch Competition at London Business School. The overall thesis has been updated post-competition,
Post mortem review: The fundamental thesis remains valid. Revenue grew 14% in 2025 (18% FX-neutral), Product Commerce EBITDA margins expanded 88bps, Taiwan is sustaining triple-digit growth, and the Wow Membership moat is intact. The stock is down 39% from entry not because the business broke, but because management did. A December 2025 data breach exposing 33 million accounts triggered securities class actions, regulatory investigations, and parliamentary hearings. This compounded an already escalating labour scandal in which founder Bom Kim was named personally in criminal complaints over industrial accident concealment. The market repriced management quality, not business quality. At ~$19.66, the stock trades below the original DCF bear case of $27.09. Q1 2026 results are the first clean read on whether customer churn from the data incident was temporary. If recovery is confirmed, the disconnect between fundamentals and price becomes the opportunity. The original model requires revision to reflect post-thesis developments: near-term Product Commerce growth assumptions, DO EBITDA loss trajectory widening to $995mn in 2025, and KRW/USD assumptions. A revised model is expected to produce a lower target price than the original $41.42, though meaningful upside to the current price of ~$19.66 is likely to be preserved.
 
 

Summary

Recommendation
BUY
Ticker
NYSE: CPNG
Industry
Internet Department Stores
Current price
USD 32.07 (as of 29 Oct 2025)
Current market cap
USD 56.8bn
Recommend purchase price
BUY NOW at $32.05
Current valuation
EV/EBITDA 49x
Target price
USD 41.42
Upside (%)
29%
Date
30 Oct 2025

Company background/ Business model

  1. Company’s Background Coupang Inc. (NYSE: CPNG) is engaging in provision of retail, restaurant delay, video streaming and fintech services to customers mainly at South Korea, expanding their business to Asian clients (Taiwan and Japan). The brand they operate currently under Coupang Inc. is Coupang, Coupang Eats, Coupang Play and Farfetch. The segment is divided into Product Commerce (“PC”) and Development Offering (“DO”).
  1. Business Model
    1. Product Commerce: Core retail and marketplace offerings, including Rocket Fresh (T+1 grocery delivery) and its’ advertising products, associated with these offerings.
      1. Direct purchase of inventories, and production of Private Labelling products
      2. Store in nation-wide warehouses and logistics centres
      3. Delivery with their in-house delivery solutions (Coupang Man)
    2. Development Offerings:
      1. Coupang Eats - Restaurant ordering and delivery
      2. Coupang Play - Online content streaming
      3. Farfetch - Global luxury fashion marketplace

Investment Thesis

  1. Thesis #1. Unrivalled frontrunner of S. Korea e-commerce market with “Rocket Delivery”; locking into the Coupang ecosystem by membership
      • Current market share: 22%+ (end-2024) according to Yonhap New Agency by payment volume
      • Monthly Active User (MAU): 32.4mn
      • Paid Subscription User: 15mn (est.)
      Background: Core offering ‘Rocket Delivery’ and ‘Rocket Fresh’; if you have paid membership (Wow Membership), Rocket Delivery guarantees next-day delivery and Rocket Fresh guarantees delivery by 7am for groceries.
      With 32.4mn MAU against a working-age population of 36.3mn, Coupang has effectively saturated its addressable domestic user base. The scale is a starting point; at this volume, the cumulative capital expenditure of $4.1bn over a decade was justified. This scale was bankrolled by SoftBank's Vision Fund, making a bet on infrastructure-first strategy; absorbing years of operating losses to fund a logistics network that no other competitor could match; and SoftBank (Masayoshi Son) retains 15.9% of shares outstanding.
      The infrastructure reached critical mass, and unit economics flipped with economy of scale. Korean geography was supportive of this bet, as 50% of population concentrated in Greater Seoul region at high-rise residential density; and near-100% broadband penetration made Rocket Delivery operationally viable at scale. Currently Coupang holds 227 warehouses reaching 4.65mn sqm which is twice the nearest competitor. That footprint is not replicable without first matching Coupang’s order volume.
      The moat is holding with 58% fee increase in August 2024, producing no material subscriber decline. Currently there are 15mn paid users with 82% one-month retention and 57.2% exclusive-use rate which represents pricing power, not loyalty. Volume funds infrastructure, infrastructure enables guarantee, guarantee drives membership, membership locks in volume.
      Coupang can now fund itself without capital injection.
       
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  1. Thesis #2: Geographic and category expansion beyond the Korean core
      • DO revenue growth: 92.2% CAGR (vs. 12.5% CAGR on PC)
      • Despite negative EBITDA (-18.1% of segment sales), the improvement is ongoing (from -35.8% in 2022)
      Domestic user growth has a ceiling; at 89%+ penetration of Korea’s working-age population, incremental MAU gains are structurally limited. The next growth vector should be coming from outside Korea; across two distinct tracks.
      First: Asian e-commerce replication. Taiwan is the primary testbed. Amazon does not operate in Taiwan, leaving a structural gap that Coupang’s fulfilment model is purpose-built to fill for Coupang Taiwan (Coupang 酷澎). 2Q25 earnings showed 54% revenue growth and 40% paid membership growth QoQ. Although profitability remains negative; the trajectory mirrors Korea’s early years. Japan is a separate bet; Rocket Now (ロケットナウ) entered as a low fixed-cost food delivery service, currently covering Tokyo; deliberately avoiding the full logistics replication that failed in 2021. Lower commitment, lower downside.
      Second track: Global Luxury via Farfetch. This is a different business, entirely, with different customer, different geography and different brand. Coupang acquired Farfetch to enter the global luxury marketplace, without carrying the Coupang brand into markets where it has no recognition. Farfetch’s existing relationships with luxury houses, and its established global user base are the asset. The risk is Farfetch’s own profitability history; which requires monitoring.
      DO revenue is growing at 92.2% CAGR versus 12.5% on Product Commerce. The segment is still EBITDA-negative at -18.1% of segment sales, improving from -35.8% in 2022.
      The loss is narrowing. The direction is right.
       
  1. Thesis #3. Domestic ecosystem reinforcement — locking in B2C, building B2B
      • Total $4.1B CAPEX investment has been done (2018 till date) – built 227 warehouses & logistic centres across nationwide
      • Coupang Intelligent Cloud (CIC) launched in July 2025 as Cloud Computing business – aim is to 1) Operational Efficiency to their own business and 2) to fulfil AI initiatives in-house + tailwind from government initiative to groom the AI industry
      • CIC is on track by 2030. Breakdown by warehouse automation efficiency improving EBITDA margin of 1.5-2.0% (rough estimation) plus external reliance on AWS Cloud will be insourced and enabling 30-40bps margin improvement. Conservatively, this will be estimated around 150bps EBITDA improvement.
      Beyond logistics, Coupang is building a closed ecosystem where every additional service raises the cost of leaving.
      Coupang Play and Coupang Eats are not a standalone profit centres. They are membership retention tools. Coupang Play’s investment in its original contents, including SNL Korea and its partnership with HBO, acts as acquisition channels; pulling new users into the Wow Membership ecosystem. Coupang Eats benefits from a simpler mechanic; members who have already paid are incentivised to extract value from every perk available. As of October 2025, Coupang Eats is the most widely used delivery app in Greater Seoul; second largest nationwide. Both services negatively impact EBITDA, but both are doing their jobs.
      Amazon remains Coupang’s permanent benchmark. Coupang Intelligent Cloud (CIC) is the B2B layer; launched in July 2025, targeting two main outcomes. First is internal operational efficiency; warehouse automation to reduce unit costs and bring AWS reliance in-house. Once it is in-house, the AWS Cloud will be insourced and enable 30-40bps margin improvement. On warehouse automation, Coupang targets 1.5-2.0% EBITDA margin improvement. Total, the improvement is conservatively estimated as 150bps EBITDA improvement.
      Korean government AI policy provides direct regulatory tailwind; Coupang, incorporated in Korea, is positioned to capture it.
      DO EBITDA margin has improved from -35.8% in 2022 to -18.1% today. CIC is the next lever. The ecosystem is not yet profitable. It is becoming harder to leave.
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Valuation

DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW
Long-term Growth Rate (post-2034)
%
2.00%
Terminal Value in 2034 (UFCF)
$mn
110,788
Terminal Value in 2034 (LFCF)
$mn
99,598
Enterprise Value (UFCF)
$mn
78,700
EV less Debt & Cash
$mn
74,097
Equity Value (LFCF)
$mn
69,958
Share price based on UFCF less Debt
$
40.64
Share price based on LFCF
$
38.37
Average share price
$
39.51
EV/EBITDA
EBITDA Multiple
x
20.00x
Terminal Value in 2034
113,753
PV of TV in 2034
56,486
EV Less Debt
75,569
Share price based on EV/EBITDA
$
41.45
PRICE/SALES RATIO
Price-to-Sales ratio
x
2.50x
Sales in 2034
63,589
PV of Sales in 2034
31,576
Sales per share
17.32
Price-to-Sales multiple
$
43.30
# of shares outstanding
#
1,647,684,518
Diluted # of shares outstanding
#
1,823,065,223
DCF Valuation
$
39.51
EV/EBITDA Valuation
$
41.45
P/S Valuation
$
43.30
Target Price from valuation
$
41.42
  • 40% of P/S to capture growth;
  • 30% of EV/EBITDA for profitability transition;
  • 30% of DCF for intrinsic value foundation.
Three methodologies are applied with differentiated weights, reflecting Coupang's current position as a high-growth company in transition towards profitability.
P/S Ratio (2.5x / 40% weight)
Coupang remains in a top-line growth phase where revenue expansion outpaces margin development. P/S captures this dynamic more accurately than profit-based metrics. The 2.5x multiple sits between the peer unweighted average of 1.50x and Amazon's 5yr average of 3.06x. This reflects Coupang's superior logistics moat relative to regional peers (Lotte Shopping 0.15x, Shinsegae 0.27x, JD.com 0.44x) but applies a discount to Amazon given Coupang's smaller scale and limited geographic diversification. DO segment growth at 92.2% CAGR provides additional upside not yet captured in peer multiples. 40% weight reflects that top-line growth and user expansion remain the primary valuation drivers at this stage.
EV/EBITDA (20x / 30% weight)
20x aligns with Amazon's 5yr average of 20.5x, reflecting Coupang's comparable fulfilment-first business model and trajectory towards margin expansion. A premium to the peer unweighted average of 12.7x is justified by Coupang's dominant domestic market position, 89%+ working-age population penetration, and DO growth optionality. 30% weight balances future margin expansion potential against near-term operating profit volatility.
DCF (WACC 8.1% / Terminal growth 2% / 30% weight)
DCF serves as the intrinsic value anchor. WACC of 8.1% reflects a 95/5 equity-debt capital structure, historical beta, and long-term risk-free rate assumptions consistent with Korean market conditions. Terminal growth of 2% is in line with long-term Korean inflation and GDP trend. Tax rate of 26.4% reflects the Korean statutory corporate tax rate including local income tax. 30% weight is applied given the elevated uncertainty in 10yr cash flow forecasts for a company still in reinvestment phase; terminal value assumptions carry disproportionate influence at this stage.

Risks

  1. Macro / Structural
    1. KRW/USD exchange rate
      1. Risk: Coupang generates revenue predominantly in Korean Won but reports in US dollars and trades on the NYSE. Won depreciation directly compresses dollar-denominated earnings without any operational deterioration. FX-neutral growth has consistently run 5-10 percentage points above reported growth, illustrating the scale of this structural drag.
        Mitigation: Limited direct hedging available at this scale. Monitor FX-neutral growth as the primary operational performance metric. A sustained KRW recovery or revenue diversification into non-KRW markets (Taiwan, Japan) naturally reduces concentration over time.
    2. Domestic consumption
      1. Risk: A severe enough contraction in consumer spending could reduce absolute transaction volumes. Offline retail is more exposed than online; in a downturn consumers tend to consolidate on value platforms.
        Mitigation: Coupang is a net beneficiary of channel shift from offline to online. E-commerce penetration continues to expand even as broader consumption softens. Membership lock-in further insulates volume from discretionary pullback. Acute contraction is a tail risk, not a base case.
  1. Business Risk
    1. Farfetch profitability
      1. Risk: Farfetch reached adjusted EBITDA breakeven in Q4 2024, ahead of schedule. However, full-year 2024 revenue of $1.7bn remains well below its 2022 high of $2.3bn. PwC has attached a going concern warning to Farfetch UK, noting dependency on continued Coupang financing. A deterioration in luxury consumer demand or execution misstep could require further capital injection, dragging on DO segment EBITDA.
        Mitigation: Coupang has demonstrated disciplined cost management at Farfetch since acquisition. Turnaround trajectory is directionally correct. Farfetch is ring-fenced within DO and does not affect Product Commerce fundamentals. Constant monitoring of quarterly adjusted EBITDA progression required.
    2. CIC execution risk
      1. Risk: Coupang Intelligent Cloud launched in July 2025 with a 2030 target for full operational impact. The 150bps EBITDA improvement estimate is an internal projection with no external validation. Timeline slippage or underdelivery on warehouse automation directly impairs the margin expansion thesis.
        Mitigation: Internal efficiency gains (AWS insourcing, warehouse automation) are partially independent of external B2B revenue. Even partial delivery on automation targets provides measurable EBITDA benefit. Government AI policy tailwind reduces regulatory friction. This remains the least proven component of the investment case.
    3. Labour & Regulatory Risk
      1. Risk: Coupang has faced sustained labour scrutiny over working conditions at its logistics centres. Multiple delivery worker deaths linked to overwork have been reported, with union groups alleging systematic underreporting of industrial accidents. The Delivery Worker Labour Union has claimed workers' right to rest is being violated, and Coupang has faced accusations of maintaining a blacklist of short-term workers to limit rehiring. If labour regulations tighten, SG&A cost increases of +100bps are plausible.
        Mitigation: Coupang's flexible delivery workforce has been classified as independent contractors rather than direct employees, limiting the scope of direct liability on the largest workforce category. The core Rocket Delivery model relies on in-house "Coupang Friends" drivers who receive full benefits. Regulatory outcome remains uncertain. Active monitoring required.
  1. Competitive Risk
    1. C-Commerce (Temu, AliExpress, JD.com)
      1. Risk: Chinese platforms have committed physical warehouse infrastructure in Korea, with transaction volume doubling to $2bn over two years. JD.com has established a local warehouse. The risk is category convergence, particularly in lower-margin commodity categories where Rocket Delivery speed is less of a differentiator.
        Mitigation: Coupang competes on speed and reliability; C-Commerce competes on price. Core value propositions are distinct. Rocket Delivery guarantee is not replicable without matching Coupang's warehouse footprint and order volume. C-Commerce players face the same infrastructure barrier that kept every domestic competitor behind Coupang.
    2. Korean Domestic Shopping Platform
      1. Risk: Naver Shopping benefits from search intent dominance. Kakao Commerce operates within a messaging ecosystem with 45mn+ users. Incremental fulfilment investment by either platform narrows Coupang's logistics moat over time.
        Mitigation: Neither platform has demonstrated willingness to absorb the CAPEX required to match Coupang's 227-warehouse footprint. Membership lock-in and Rocket Delivery reliability create switching costs that search or messaging integration cannot easily replicate. Slow-burn risk, not acute threat.
 

Catalysts

  1. Near-term (0-12 months)
      • Taiwan momentum confirmation: Taiwan is the primary near-term catalyst. Triple-digit revenue growth in Q2 2025 is encouraging, but the key inflection point is a sustained deceleration into high double-digit growth, signalling that the market is maturing rather than collapsing. Each quarterly earnings call is a check-in on whether the Korea trajectory is replicating. A maintained 40%+ paid membership growth rate would be the cleaner signal.
      • KRW/USD normalisation: FX-neutral growth has consistently run 5-10 percentage points above reported growth. A KRW recovery against the dollar would mechanically lift reported revenue and EBITDA without any operational change. This is not a business catalyst but a significant earnings re-rating trigger in a dollar-reporting stock.
  1. Medium to Long-term (1-3 years+)
      • Competitive landscape consolidation: The Korean e-commerce market has seen meaningful attrition among second-tier players. Qoo10's financial difficulties and the collapse of Tmon have accelerated market share consolidation. As weaker competitors exit, Coupang is the natural beneficiary of displaced GMV. This is already underway and continues to compound Coupang's dominant position.
      • CIC reaching material scale: The first external B2B cloud contract or public partnership announcement would validate CIC as a revenue stream rather than an internal efficiency project. Combined with warehouse automation delivering measurable margin improvement, this would re-rate the stock on a wider EBITDA multiple. The 150bps improvement target becomes investable once there is a credible implementation milestone.
      • Geographic expansion beyond Taiwan: A formal market entry announcement into a Southeast Asian city with comparable density characteristics to Greater Seoul, or an expansion of Rocket Now beyond Tokyo, would extend the DO growth thesis beyond 2030. Amazon's absence in multiple Asian markets leaves structural gaps that Coupang's fulfilment model is positioned to fill.
      • Regulatory protection against C-Commerce: The Korean government has shown increasing awareness of the competitive threat posed by Chinese platforms. Temu, AliExpress, and JD.com have faced growing scrutiny over product safety standards, customs compliance, and consumer protection. A regulatory tightening targeting C-Commerce platforms, whether through stricter import duty enforcement, product certification requirements, or platform liability rules, would directly impair the price advantage that is their primary differentiator. Coupang, operating under Korean regulations and with an established compliance infrastructure, would be the primary domestic beneficiary. This catalyst is policy-dependent and binary in nature, but the political direction is consistent with broader Korea-China trade tensions and domestic industry protection sentiment.
 

Post Mortem Review — April 2026

Thesis (Oct 2025)
Actual (Apr 2026)
Entry price
$32.07
Target price
$41.42
Current price
~$19.66
Return
+29% (expected)
-39% (actual)
Summary
The fundamental cash flow thesis remains largely intact, where PC continues to generate strong FCF, Taiwan is delivering triple-digit revenue growth, and EBITDA margins are expanding. The business is performing broadly in line with the investment case.
The stock is not.
The gap between business performance and share price performance is explained almost entirely by a compounding regulatory and reputational crisis that was underweighted at the time of the original thesis.
What went wrong
Data Breach Incident. This was the triggering event; in November 2025, a former employee was accused to illegally accessed data from over 33 million user accounts, representing roughly two-third of the Korean population. The breach was severe; the response compounded the damage. Management’s handling drew regulatory scrutiny, parliamentary hearings, and multiple securities class action filings in th US, with lead plaintiff deadlines set for February 2026. Greenoaks and Altimeter filed a Section 301 petition alleging discriminatory treatment of Coupang by the Korean government, though this was subsequently withdrawn in March 2026 after the Trump administration signalled its intention to advance broader Section 301 actions against Korea on behalf of US technology firms.
The labour situation escalated in parallel. Evidence emerged of systematic industrial accident concealment going back to 2020, including alleged instructions from senior management to destroy records and pressure bereaved families into private settlements. Criminal investigations were opened. Founder Bom Kim was named personally in complaints filed with Korean police. These were not independent events. They formed a pattern. Regulators, investors, and the press concluded that Coupang's management culture was structurally problematic, not episodically unlucky.
KRW weakness added mechanical pressure on top. FX-neutral growth remained strong, but dollar-denominated reported numbers disappointed, giving sell-side cover to cut targets. Morgan Stanley lowered to $29, BofA to $28, Barclays to $24.
What the original thesis missed
The labour risk section flagged overwork deaths and regulatory scrutiny but treated it as an active monitoring situation rather than a material near-term risk. That was wrong. The data breach risk was explicitly deferred as a post-October 2025 development. In hindsight, management governance quality should have been assessed as an independent risk factor. It was not.
Business performance: largely intact
Full year 2025 revenue reached $34.5bn, up 14% YoY and 18% on an FX-neutral basis. Gross profit margin expanded 19bps to 29.4%. Product Commerce EBITDA margin expanded 88bps to 8.4% for the full year. Taiwan's last-mile network now covers 70% of the island's geography, handling 75% of volume as next-day delivery, with triple-digit growth sustained. Farfetch reached adjusted EBITDA breakeven in its first full quarter under Coupang. Cash position remains above $6bn. The core business is executing.
Q1 2026: the decisive checkpoint
Q4 revenue of $8.84bn missed consensus of $9.26bn by 4.5%, with the data incident directly impacting working capital and free cash flow. Management confirmed growth hit a low of 4% in January before showing improving trends in February. Wow Membership churn has returned to historical lows. Q1 2026 results will determine whether the customer impact was temporary or structural. Product Commerce active customer count and revenue growth recovery are the key metrics to watch.
The fundamental case has not broken. At ~$19.66, the stock trades at a material discount to the original DCF bear case of $27.09. The moat is intact. The question is whether management credibility can be restored enough for the market to price the business on its fundamentals again.
Model Update Required
The original model requires revision to reflect post-thesis developments. Key inputs affected: near-term Product Commerce growth assumptions following the December 2025 data incident and January growth trough; DO EBITDA loss trajectory, which widened to $995mn in 2025 from $631mn in 2024 driven by accelerated Taiwan investment; and KRW/USD assumptions given sustained won weakness through the period. A revised model is expected to produce a lower target price than the original $41.42, though meaningful upside to the current price of ~$19.66 is likely to be preserved given the strength of the underlying cash flow generation.